Going into a World Cup, we tend to vastly overestimate the quality required to win the tournament.

All eventual winners have weaknesses. Many of them are entirely average in the group stage. Some have a serious problem with a lack of firepower up front.

Not every World Cup winner is Brazil 1970. Many more World Cup winners have offered a solid defensive record and a habit of squeezing through by a single-goal margin or winning on a penalty shootout.

Here are six lessons from the six most recent winners of the tournament: France in 1998, Brazil in 2002, Italy in 2006, Spain in 2010, Germany in 2014 and France in 2018.

You don’t need to impress in the group stage

Plenty of football analysis works backwards from the result, particularly at World Cups. Once you see the winning captain lift the trophy and the street parties back home, you look back on that side’s performance in awe.

But things are often much trickier in the group stage. Granted, the 1998 and 2002 winners, France and Brazil, both managed nine points (although France, given a particularly easy draw, made things much look harder than that would suggest).

More recent winners have laboured. In 2006, Italy barely got out of first gear in the group stage (and were hugely fortunate to get past Australia in the second round). Spain contrived to lose their opener in 2010, a 1-0 defeat to Switzerland when Vincente del Bosque’s side lacked any kind of penetration.

In 2014, Germany thrashed Portugal 4-0, partly thanks to Pepe’s foolish first-half red card. They then needed to throw on Plan B Miroslav Klose against Ghana and just about squeezed past the United States 1-0.

France were truly wretched in the group stage four years ago, scoring just three goals in three group games — one a penalty, another an own goal — and contributing to probably the worst game of the tournament, a 0-0 draw with Denmark. They recorded non-penalty xG (expected goals) figures of 0.6, 1.9 and then 0.3 in the group.

None of the past four World Cup winners have collected nine points from the group stage and perhaps more pertinently, none were even close to being the most impressive side in the competition during the first three games.

But no trophies are handed out after three games. The group stage is about getting the job done and with a congested schedule and larger squads, World Cup 2022 might be a tournament where the big sides start slowly, with managers rotating more than we’ve come to expect.

Form is temporary, class is permanent

Supporters always want the manager to select “in-form” players. Sometimes this represents a reasonable call for the old guard to make way, but often it’s just a knee-jerk reaction to a month or so of good performances.

Successful international coaches, though, tend to stick with the tried and tested. The best example was Del Bosque’s approach in 2010. He had desperately tried to placate the warring Barcelona and Real Madrid factions and maintained a delicate balance. Victor Valdes and Pepe Reina had both outperformed Iker Casillas in 2009-10, but Del Bosque was never likely to drop his captain. Andres Iniesta, meanwhile, suffered an injury-hit campaign and struggled for fitness going into the tournament, but Del Bosque stuck with him and was rewarded when Iniesta grabbed the winner in the final.

Germany’s star performer in the final four years later was Bastian Schweinsteiger, by that point a veteran approaching his third World Cup. Schweinsteiger had been badly out of form for Bayern, however — and in truth, his club career never really recovered. But for a month in Brazil, Schweinsteiger was outstanding.

Something similar could be said of Paul Pogba in 2018, who had endured an underwhelming second season for Manchester United and was, some believed, in danger of losing his place in the France side. But Pogba played an intelligent, measured central midfield role throughout France’s successful campaign and was also arguably the best player at Euro 2020 until France’s elimination.

Paul Pogba with the World Cup in 2018 (Photo: Ulrik Pedersen/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

You can also point to Marcello Lippi’s faith in Francesco Totti in 2006 after he’d only recently returned from a broken leg — many doubted he would be fit enough to shine.

And it would take a foolish manager to ignore Ronaldo. Going into World Cup 2002, he’d scored just 10 goals in the previous three domestic campaigns combined because of injury and hadn’t netted for Brazil in nearly three years.

Aime Jacquet, meanwhile, stood by Zinedine Zidane after his red card against Saudi Arabia in 1998, reinstating him as soon as he’d served his suspension, when some suggested he deserved more serious punishment.

There’s always room for a wildcard option, especially now managers can select 26 players. But it’s worth remembering the extent to which World Cup legends were often doubted going into the tournaments that now define them.

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There’s often a major system change along the way

If a manager hasn’t decided on his optimum system going into the tournament, it’s not a disaster. As long as things are set by the quarter-final, things should be fine.

Jacquet’s initial system in 1998 featured a young Thierry Henry out wide, but by the quarter-final stage, he’d changed his mind and based his attacking trio around two “No 10s”, Zinedine Zidane and Youri Djorkaeff, behind Stephane Guivarc’h.

Luiz Felipe Scolari’s change in 2002 was subtler. For the first four matches, he used Gilberto Silva as the only true defensive midfielder, with Juninho Paulista pushing forward into attack. For the quarter-final, though, he introduced Kleberson in place of Juninho as a more defensive option and he was arguably Brazil’s best player in the final.

Brazil celebrate winning the World Cup in 2002, with Kleberson crouching on the far left (Photo: Matthias Schrader/Picture Alliance via Getty Images)

In 2006, Lippi was always likely to be flexible and went into the tournament capable of playing 4-3-1-2 or 4-4-1-1. He used the former in three of Italy’s first four games but switched to the 4-4-1-1 from the quarter-final stage onwards, opening up a place for Argentinian-turned-Italian Mauro Camoranesi to become a surprise starter in the closing stages.

In 2010, Del Bosque resisted the urges of his Barcelona players, who wanted him to ditch his favoured 4-2-3-1 and use the 4-3-3 that Xavi Hernandez and Iniesta, in particular, were more comfortable with. There was a significant change, though — David Villa moved up front having originally played from the left, with Pedro Rodriguez coming into the side and Iniesta effectively switching flanks.

Germany’s unconvincing performances in the first four games at World Cup 2014 prompted two major changes. The formation remained similar, broadly 4-3-3. But Philipp Lahm, who controversially began the tournament in the holding role, switched to his more customary right-back position, allowing Jerome Boateng to shift infield and offer more speed in the centre of defence. He was outstanding in the final. Up front, Joachim Low moved away from the fluid front trio of Mesut Ozil, Thomas Muller and Mario Gotze and brought in Klose as a proper No 9. Muller moved to the right and Ozil switched from the right to the left, a la Iniesta.

Didier Deschamps did something similar four years later, albeit much earlier. He started the tournament with a 4-3-3, featuring a fluid front three of Antoine Griezmann, Kylian Mbappe and Ousmane Dembele. But by the second game, it was 4-2-3-1, with Olivier Giroud up front, Mbappe moved to the right and Blaise Matuidi playing as a defensive-minded left-winger to offer balance on the other side.

Knockout stage clean sheets are vital

To win a knockout tournament, you must not lose. The best way to ensure you don’t lose is to keep a clean sheet.

This is perhaps a mere truism, but the pattern is clear. The six most recent World Cup winners have, in their combined 24 knockout matches, kept 17 clean sheets — indicated by the green results below.

Spain, notably, didn’t concede a knockout goal in 2010. Germany only conceded twice in the knockout stage four years later, with those goals coming in the final minute of extra time against Algeria, when they were already 2-0 up, and the final minute against Brazil, when they were already 7-0 up. Italy’s only concession in 2006, meanwhile, came from the penalty spot in the final.

France, four years ago, are something of an anomaly — they conceded five goals in the knockout stage, although once again, two of those were late consolations when the game was effectively over.

Can we spot which sides are likely to keep knockout stage clean sheets on the basis of group stage performance? Not necessarily. World Cup winners don’t concede many, but none of the last six winners kept three clean sheets in the group stage (Argentina in 1998, Switzerland in 2006, and Uruguay in 2010 and 2018 did) or boasted the best defensive record in the competition. In fact, Brazil in 2002 and Spain in 2010 both conceded more goals in three group-stage matches than they did in their four knockout games.

Perhaps a more promising sign is solid full-backs; those who are more defenders than they are speedy overlappers. We can discount Brazil 2002 here, as they used a three-man defence and wing-backs.

But France’s Lilian Thuram and Spain’s Sergio Ramos would both become more renowned as centre-backs than right-backs. Germany’s Benedikt Howedes, a right-footed centre-back by trade, was a bizarrely uncomfortable left-back but at least kept things tight at the back, while Monaco pairing Djibril Sidibe and Benjamin Mendy were considered France’s first-choice duo going into World Cup 2018, before both suffered from fitness problems, so the more disciplined pairing of Lucas Hernandez and Benjamin Pavard played instead. Maybe it helped.

A prolific No 9 is not necessary

Ronaldo in 2002 ruins this. He scored eight times in seven matches, the most anyone had managed at a single World Cup since Gerd Muller in 1970. But he’s very much the exception to the rule.

Otherwise, sides don’t need a prolific No 9 at all. Here are the top goalscorers for the winning nation at the last six World Cups.

OK, so they’re not bad goal tallies. David Villa, for example, was the joint-top goalscorer at World Cup 2010. But that’s not the entire story because Villa actually scored all five of his goals in matches where he started from the left, with Fernando Torres leading the line. When he moved up front, he didn’t score.

So the argument isn’t that you don’t need a player who scores, it’s that you don’t need a prolific player leading the line.

In fact, three of the last six World Cup winners have benefited from no goals in the entire tournament from the player who started as the primary striker in each of the seven games — France in 1998 and 2018, plus Spain in 2010.

Italy in 2006 is a slightly complex case — they played with a 4-3-1-2 featuring a genuine strike duo in three of their matches, so let’s include both Luca Toni and Alberto Gilardino. If we’re being particularly fussy, we can say that Toni was the more ‘fixed’ striker in those games, started six times, and only scored in one game.

For Germany, Muller smashed in a hat-trick in the opener in 2010 against 10-man Portugal and also scored against the USA, but then gave way to Klose as the primary striker. Klose stuck one away against Brazil, but then again, who didn’t? Klose played the last three games and scored one of Germany’s nine goals.

You need a useful No 9 more than you need a prolific No 9. Although if you have Ronaldo, that does help.

Most World Cup winners need extra time or penalties along the way

Well, the pattern here is slightly mixed. Brazil in 2002 and France in 2018 won all four knockout matches in 90 minutes, which is somewhat rare.

France in 1998 and Italy in 2006 both won one match in extra time, then needed penalties in the subsequent game.

Spain and Germany won their finals in extra time, while Germany had also wobbled badly against Algeria in the second round and needed extra time.

If we go back even further, Brazil (in the final against Italy) in 1994 and West Germany (in the semi-final against England) in 1990 also needed penalties en route to success.

It’s also worth citing last year’s European Championship, where Italy won on penalties in the semi-final and the final. There is also the last World Cup, where runners-up Croatia needed a shootout to get past Denmark and Russia (who had themselves made it past Spain on penalties in the previous round).

These days, we know penalties aren’t a lottery. Teams must be prepared.

(Top photo: Vicente Del Bosque holds World Cup in 2010; by Javier Soriano/AFP via Getty Images)